Abstract. Gödel's main contribution to set theory is his proof that GCH is consistent with ZFC (assuming that ZF is consistent). For this proof he has introduced the important ideas of constructibility of sets, and of absoluteness of formulas. In this paper we show how these two ideas of Gödel naturally lead to a simple unified framework for dealing with computability of functions and relations, domain independence of queries in relational databases, and predicative set theory.
Introduction: Absoluteness and Constructibility
Gödel classical work [6] on the constructible universe L is best known for its applications in pure set theory, especially consistency and independence proofs. Its relevance to computability theory was mostly ignored. Still, in this work Gödel introduced at least two ideas which are quite important from a computational point of view:
Computations with Sets The notion of computation is usually connected with discrete structures, like the natural numbers, or strings of symbols from some alphabet. In this respect [6] is important, first of all, in being the first comprehensive research on (essentially) computability within a completely different framework (technically, the name Gödel used was "constructibility" rather than "computability", but the difference is not really significant). No less important (as we shall see) is the particularly important data structure for which computability issues were investigated in [6] : sets. Specifically, for characterizing the "constructible sets" Gödel identified operations on sets (which we may call "computable"), that may be used for "effectively" constructing new sets from given ones (in the process of creating the universe of "constructible" sets). Thus, binary union and intersection are "effective" in this sense, while the powerset operation is not. Gödel has even provided a finite list of basic set operations, from which all other "effective" constructions can be obtained through compositions. Absoluteness A formula in the language of set theory is absolute if its truth value in a transitive class M , for some assignment v of objects from M to its free variables, depends only on v, but not on M (i.e. the truth value is the same in all structures M , in which v is legal). Absoluteness is a property of formulas which was crucial for Gödel consistency proof. However, it is not a decidable property. The following set ∆ 0 of absolute formulas is therefore extensively used as a syntactically defined approximation: -Every atomic formula is in ∆ 0 .
-If ϕ and ψ are in ∆ 0 , then so are ¬ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ, and ϕ ∧ ψ.
-If x and y are two different variables, and ϕ is in ∆ 0 , then so is ∃x ∈ yϕ.
Now there is an obvious analogy between the roles in set theory of absolute formulas and of ∆ 0 formulas, and the roles in formal arithmetic and computability theory of decidable formulas and of arithmetical ∆ 0 formulas (i.e. Smullyan's "bounded" formulas). This analogy was noticed and exploited in the research on set theory. However, the reason for this analogy remains unclear, and beyond this analogy the importance and relevance of these two ideas of Gödel to other areas have not been noticed. As a result, strongly related ideas and theory have been redeveloped from scratch in relational database theory.
Domain Independence and Computability in Databases
From a logical point of view, a relational database DB of a scheme {P 1 , . . . , P n } is just a tuple P 1 , . . . , P n of finite interpretations (called "tables") of the predicate symbols P 1 , . . . , P n . DB can be turned into a structure S for a first-order language L with equality, the signature of which includes {P 1 , . . . , P n } and constants, by specifying a domain D, and an interpretation of the constants of L in it (different interpretations for different constants). The domain D should be at most countable (and usually it is finite), and should of course include the union of the domains of the tables in DB. A query for DB is simply a formula ψ of L. If ψ has free variables, then the answer to ψ in S is the set of tuples which satisfy it in S. If ψ is closed, then the answer to the query is either "yes" or "no", depending on whether ψ holds in S or not (The "yes" and "no" can be interpreted as {∅} and ∅, respectively). Now not every formula ψ of a L can serve as a query. Acceptable are only those the answer for which is a computable function of P 1 , . . . , P n alone (and does not depend on the identity of the intended domain D. This in particular entails that the answer should be finite). Such queries are called domain independent ( [8, 11, 1] ). The exact definition is:
1 Let σ be a signature which includes − → P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, and optionally constants and other predicate symbols (but no function symbols). A query ϕ(x 1 . . . . , x n ) in σ is called
, if whenever S 1 and S 2 are structures for σ, S 1 is a substructure of S 2 , and the interpretations of {P 1 , . . . , P n } in S 1 and S 2 are identical, then for all a 1 ∈ S 2 , . . . , a n ∈ S 2 :
Practical database query languages are designed so that only d.i. queries can be formulated in them. Unfortunately, it is undecidable which formulas are d.i. (or "safe" according to any other reasonable notion of safety of queries, like "finite and computable"). Therefore all commercial query languages (like SQL) allow to use as queries only formulas from some syntactically defined class of d.i. formulas. Many explicit proposals of decidable, syntactically defined classes of safe formulas have been made in the literature. The simplest among them (and the closer to what has actually been implemented) is perhaps the following class SS( − → P ) ("syntactically safe" formulas for a database scheme − → P ) from [11] (originally designed for languages with no function symbols) 2 :
1.
(where x is a variable and c is a constant).
, or ϕ i is a negation of a formula of either type. (b) Every free variable x of ϕ is limited in ϕ. This means that there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that x is free in ϕ i , and either ϕ i ∈ SS( − → P ), or there exists y which is already limited in ϕ, and ϕ i ∈ {x = y, y = x}.
It should be noted that there is one clause in this definition which is somewhat strange: the last one, which treats conjunction. The reason why this clause does not simply tell us (like in the case of disjunction) when a conjunction of two formulas is in SS( − → P ), is the desire to take into account the fact that once the value of y (say) is known, the formula x = y becomes domain independent. In the unified framework described in the next section this problematic clause is replaced by a more concise one (which at the same time is more general).
A more important fact is that given {P 1 , . . . , P n }, the set of relations which are answers to some query in SS( − → P ) is exactly the closure of {P 1 , . . . , P n } under a finite set of basic operations called "the relational algebra" ( [1, 11] ). This set is quite similar to set of basic operations used by Gödel in [6] for constructing the constructible universe.
Partial Domain Independence and Absoluteness
There is an obvious similarity between the concepts of d.i. in databases, and absoluteness in Set Theory. However, the two notions are not identical. Thus, the formula x = x is not d.i., although it is clearly absolute. To exploit the similarity, the formula property of d.i. was turned in [2] into the following relation between a formula ϕ and finite subsets of F v(ϕ):
. with respect to {x 1 , . . . , x n }, if whenever S 1 and S 2 are structures as in Definition 1, then for all a 1 ∈ S 2 , . . . , a n ∈ S 2 and b 1 ∈ S 1 , . . . , b k ∈ S 1 :
On the other hand the formula x = y is only partially d.i.: it is d.i. with respect to {x} and {y}, but not with respect to {x, y}. Note also that a formula ϕ is d.i. with respect to ∅ if whenever S 1 and S 2 are structures as in Definition 1 then for all
Under not very different conditions concerning S 1 and S 2 , this is precisely Gödel's idea of absoluteness. We'll return to this below.
Another important observation is that given a domain S for the database, if
. with respect to {x 1 , . . . , x n } then the function λy 1 , . . . , y k .{ x 1 , . . . , x n | ϕ} is a computable function from S k to the set of finite subsets of S n , the values of which depend only on the values of the arguments y 1 , . . . , y k , but not on the identity of S. In case n = 0 the possible values of this function are { } and ∅, which can be taken as "true" and "false", respectively. Hence in this particular case what we get is a computable k-ary predicate on S. From this point of view k-ary predicates on a set S should be viewed as a special type of functions from S k to the set of finite sets of S-tuples, rather than as a special type of functions from S k to S, with arbitrary chosen two elements from S serving as the two classical truth values (while like in set theory, functions from S k to S should be viewed as a special type of (k + 1)-ary predicates on S).
Now it is easy to see that partial d.i. has the following properties (where ϕ X means that ϕ is − → P −d.i. with respect to X):
These properties can be used for defining a syntactic approximation P of the semantic − → P -d.i. relation. It can easily be checked that the set {ϕ | ϕ P F v(ϕ)} strictly extends SS( − → P ) (but note how the complicated last clause in the definition of SS( − → P ) is replaced here by a concise clause concerning conjunction!).
Note: For convenience, we are taking here ∧, ∨, ¬ and ∃ as our primitives. Moreover: we take ¬(ϕ → ψ) as an abbreviation for ϕ ∧ ¬ψ, and ∀x 1 , . . . , x k ϕ as an abbreviation for ¬∃x 1 , . . . , x k ¬ϕ. This entails the following important property of "bounded quantification": If is a relation satisfying the above properties, and ϕ {x 1 , . . . , x n }, while ψ ∅, then ∃x 1 . . . x n (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∅ and ∀x 1 . . . x n (ϕ → ψ) ∅ (recall that ϕ ∅ is our counterpart of absoluteness).
Partial Domain Independence in Set Theory
We return now to set theory, to see how the idea of partial d.i. applies there. In order to fully exploit it, we use a language with abstraction terms for sets. However, we allow only terms which are known to be d.i. in a sense we now explain. For simplicity of presentation, we assume the accumulative universe V of ZF , and formulate our definitions accordingly.
Definition 3. Let M be a transitive class. Define the relativization to M of terms and formulas recursively as follows:
Definition 4. Let T be a theory such that V |= T .
1. Let t be a term, and let F v(t) = {y 1 , . . . , y n }. We say that t is T -d.i., if the following is true (in V ) for every transitive model M of T :
Let ϕ be a formula, and let F v(ϕ) = {y 1 , . . . , y n , x 1 , . . . , x k }. We say that ϕ is T -d.i. for {x 1 , . . . , x k } if { x 1 , . . . , x k | ϕ} is a set for all values of the parameters y 1 , . . . , y n , and the following is true (in V ) for every transitive model M of T :
Thus, a term is T -d.i. if it has the same interpretation in all transitive models of T which contains the values of its parameters, while a formula is T -d.i. for {x 1 , . . . , x k } if it has the same extension (which should be a set) in all transitive models of T which contains the values of its other parameters. In particular: ϕ is T -d.i. for ∅ iff it is absolute relative to T in the original sense of set theory, while ϕ is T -d.i. for F v(ϕ) iff it is domain-independent in the sense of database theory (see Definition 1) for transitive models of T . The set-theoretical notion of d.i., we have just introduced, is again a semantic notion that one cannot characterize in a constructive manner, and so a syntactic approximation of it should be used in practice. The key observation for this is that the transitive classes are the structures for which the atomic formula x ∈ y (where y is different from x) is d.i. with respect to {x}. Accordingly, an appropriate approximation is most naturally obtained by adapting the definition of P above to the present language, taking into account this key observation:
Definition 5. The relation RST is inductively defined as follows:
2. ϕ RST {x} if ϕ ∈ {x = x, x = t, t = x, x ∈ t}, and x ∈ F v(t).
6. ∃yϕ RST X − {y} if y ∈ X and ϕ RST X.
Note: It can easily be proved by induction on the complexity of formulas that the clause 0 in the definition of P is also satisfied by RST : if ϕ RST X and Z ⊆ X, then ϕ RST Z.
A first (and perhaps the most important) use of RST is for defining the set of legal terms of the corresponding system RST (Rudimentary Set Theory). Unlike the languages for databases (in which the only terms were variables and constants), the language of RST used here has a very extensive set of terms. It is inductively defined as follows:
-Every variable is a term.
-If x is a variable, and ϕ is a formula such that ϕ RST {x}, then {x | ϕ} is a term (and F v({x | ϕ}) = F v(ϕ) − {x}).
(Actually, the relation RST , the set of terms of RST , and the set of formulas of RST are defined together by a simultaneous induction). A second use of RST is that the set {ϕ | ϕ RST ∅} is a natural extension of the set ∆ 0 of bounded formulas. Moreover, we have: Theorem 1. Let RST be the theory consisting of the following axioms:
Then given an extension T of RST , any valid term t of RST is T -d.i., and if ϕ RST X, then ϕ is T -d.i. for X.
The following theorem connects RST with the class of rudimentary set functions (introduced independently by Gandy ([5] ) and Jensen ([7] ). See also [4] ) -a refined version of Gödel basic set functions: Theorem 2.
1. If F is an n-ary rudimentary function, then there exists a formula ϕ s. t.:
. . , y k } then there exists a rudimentary function F such that:
. . , x n }, and ϕ RST ∅, then ϕ defines a rudimentary predicate P . Conversely, if P is a rudimentary predicate, then there is a formula ϕ such that ϕ RST ∅, and ϕ defines P .
On Predicative Set Theory
In his writings Gödel expressed the view that his hierarchy of constructible sets codified the predicatively acceptable means of set construction, and that the only impredicative aspect of the constructible universe L is its being based on the full class On of ordinals. This seems to us to be only partially true. We think that indeed the predicatively acceptable instances of the comprehension schema are those which determine the collections they define in an absolute way, independently of any "surrounding universe". Therefore a formula ψ is predicative (with respect to x) if the collection {x | ψ(x, y 1 , . . . , y n )} is completely and uniquely determined by the identity of the parameters y 1 , . . . , y n , and the identity of other objects referred to in the formula (all of which should be well-determined before). In other words: ψ is predicative (with respect to x) iff it is d.i. (with respect to x). It follows that all the operations used by Gödel are indeed predicatively acceptable, and even capture what is intuitively predicatively acceptable in the language of RST . However, we believe that one should go beyond firstorder languages in order to capture all the predicatively acceptable means of set construction. In [3] we suggest that an adequate language for this is obtained by adding to the the language of RST an operation T C for transitive closure of binary relations, and then replacing RST by the relation P ZF , which is defined like RST , but with the following extra clause: (T C x,y ϕ)(x, y) P ZF X if ϕ P ZF X, and {x, y} ∩ X = ∅. See [3] for more details.
Domain Independence: a General Framework
In this section we introduce a general abstract framework for studying domain independence and absoluteness (originally introduced in [2] ).
-signature is a pair (σ, F ), where σ is an ordinary firstorder signature, and F is a function which assigns to every n-ary symbol s from σ (other than equality) a subset of P({1, . . . , n}). -If p ∈ σ is a predicate symbol of arity n, I ∈ F (p), and a 1 , . . . , a n are elements of S 2 such that a i ∈ S 1 in case i ∈ I, then S 2 |= p(a 1 , . . . , a n ) iff a i ∈ S 1 for all i, and S 1 |= p(a 1 , . . . , a n ). -If f ∈ σ is a function symbol of arity n, a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ S 1 , and b is the value of f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) in S 2 , then b ∈ S 1 , and b is the value of f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) in S 1 . Moreover: if I ∈ F (f ), and a 1 , . . . , a n are elements of S 2 such that a i ∈ S 1 in case i ∈ I, then S 2 |= b = f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) iff a i ∈ S 1 for all i, and
. . , a n ).
and ϕ * results from ϕ by substituting values from S 1 for the free variables of ϕ that are not in X, then the sets of tuples which satisfy ϕ * in S 1 and in S 2 are identical.
Note. We assume that we are talking only about first-order languages with equality, and so we do not include the equality symbol in our first-order signatures. Had it been included then we would have defined F (=) = {{1}, {2}} (meaning that x 1 = x 2 is d.i. w.r.t. both {x 1 } and {x 2 }, but not w.r.t. {x 1 , x 2 }).
Examples -Let σ be a signature which includes − → P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, and optionally constants and other predicate symbols (but no function symbols). Assume that the arity of P i is n i , and define
X in the sense of Definition 2. -Let σ ZF = {∈} and let F ZF (∈) = {{1}}. In this case the universe V is a (σ ZF , F ZF )− extension of the transitive sets and classes. Therefore a formula is σ ZF -absolute iff it is absolute in the usual sense of set theory.
Again the relation of (σ, F )−d.i. is a semantic notion that in practice should be replaced by a syntactic approximation. The following definition generalizes in a very natural way the relations P and RST : Definition 9. The relation (σ,F ) is inductively defined as follows:
If p is an n-ary predicate symbol of σ; x 1 , . . . , x n are n distinct variables, and
If f is an n-ary function symbol of σ; y, x 1 , . . . , x n are n+1 distinct variables, and
Again it is easy to see that if ϕ (σ,F ) X, then ϕ di (σ,F ) X. The converse fails, of course. However, we suggest the following conjecture (that for reasons to become clear in the next section, may be viewed as a generalized Church Thesis):
Conjecture. Given a d.i. signature (σ, F ), a formula is upward (σ, F )-absolute iff it is logically equivalent to a formula of the ∃y 1 , . . . , y n ψ, where ψ (σ,F ) ∅ (ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is upward (σ, F )-absolute if whenever S 2 is a (σ, F )−extension of S 1 , and |= S1 ϕ(a 1 , . . . , a n ), then |= S2 ϕ(a 1 , . . . , a n )).
3 ϕ * is a formula only in a generalized sense, but the intention should be clear.
Finally, we turn to the connections between the above ideas and computability in the Natural numbers.
Definition 10. The d.i. signature (σ N , F N ) is defined as follows:
-σ N is the first-order signature which includes the constants 0 and 1, the binary predicate <, and the ternary relations P + and P × .
Definition 11. The standard structure N for σ N has the set of natural numbers as its domain, with the usual interpretations of 0, 1, and <, and the (graphs of the) operations + and × on N (viewed as ternary relations on N ) as the interpretations of P + and P × , respectively.
It is easy now to see that N is a (σ N , F N )-extension of a structure S for σ N iff the domain of S is an initial segment of N (where the interpretations of the relation symbols are the corresponding reductions of the interpretations of those symbols in N ). Accordingly, if ϕ (σ N ,F N ) ∅, then for any assignment in N it gets the same truth value in all initial segments of N (including N itself) which contain the values assigned to its free variables. Now the set of formulas ϕ such that ϕ (σ N ,F N ) ∅ is a straightforward extension of Smullyan's set of bounded formulas ( [10] ). This set is defined of course using the relation N = (σ N ,F N ) . From definitions 9 and 10 it easily follows that this relation can be characterized as follows (compare with Definition 5!): formula ψ(x 1 , . . . , x k , y 1 , . . . , y n ) is (σ N , F N )-absolute. Given numbers n 1 , . . . , n k we search whether R(n 1 , . . . , n k ) by examining all the finite initial segments of N that contain n 1 , . . . , n k , and return "true" if we find in one of them numbers m 1 , . . . , m n such that ψ(n 1 , . . . , n k , m 1 , . . . , m n ) is true in it. From the fact that ψ is (σ N , F N )-absolute, it easily follows that this procedure halts with the correct answer in case R(n 1 , . . . , n k ), and never halt otherwise.
The last theorem shows a very close connection between (semi)-computability and (upward) absoluteness. However, further research is needed in order to understand the full connection between these notions. A key problem that one has to solve in order to provide a general computability theory based on d.i. relations and absoluteness, is what is so special about the standard interpretations in N of P + and P × that makes the last theorem possible. We suspect that in order to provide a satisfactory answer (and develop the desired theory), one should go beyond first-order languages (most probably to first-order language with a transitive closure operation). We leave that for future investigations.
